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Abstract
Context: Neural Network (NN) algorithms have been successfully adopted
in a number of Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems (SCCPSs). Testing
and Verification (T&V) of NN-based control software in safety-critical do-
mains are gaining interest and attention from both software engineering and
safety engineering researchers and practitioners.
Objective: With the increase in studies on the T&V of NN-based control
software in safety-critical domains, it is important to systematically review
the state-of-the-art T&V methodologies, to classify approaches and tools that
are invented, and to identify challenges and gaps for future studies.
Method: By searching the six most relevant digital libraries, we retrieved
950 papers on the T&V of NN-based Safety-Critical Control Software (SCCS).
Then we filtered the papers based on the predefined inclusion and exclusion
criteria and applied snowballing to identify new relevant papers.
Results: To reach our result, we selected 83 primary papers published be-
tween 2001 and 2018, applied the thematic analysis approach for analyzing
the data extracted from the selected papers, presented the classification of
approaches, and identified challenges.
Conclusion: The approaches were categorized into five high-order themes:
assuring robustness of NNs, assuring safety properties of NN-based control
software, improving the failure resilience of NNs, measuring and ensuring test
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completeness, and improving the interpretability of NNs. From the industry
perspective, improving the interpretability of NNs is a crucial need in safety-
critical applications. We also investigated nine safety integrity properties
within four major safety lifecycle phases to investigate the achievement level
of T&V goals in IEC 61508-3. Results show that correctness, completeness,
freedom from intrinsic faults, and fault tolerance have drawn most attention
from the research community. However, little effort has been invested in
achieving repeatability; no reviewed study focused on precisely defined test-
ing configuration or on defense against common cause failure.
Keywords: Software testing and verification, Neural network,
Safety-critical control software, Systematic literature review
1. Introduction
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are systems involving networks of em-
bedded systems and strong human-machine interactions [1]. Safety-critical
CPSs (SCCPSs) are a type of CPSs that highlights the severe non-functional
constraints (e.g., safety and dependability). The failure of SCCPSs could
result in loss of life or significant damage (e.g., property and environmental
damage). Typical applications of SCCPSs are in nuclear systems, aircraft
flight control systems, automotive systems, smart grids, and healthcare sys-
tems.
In the last few years, advances in Neural Networks (NNs) have boosted
the development and deployment of SCCPSs. The NNs is considered the
most viable approach to meet the complexity requirements of Safety-Critical
Control Softwares (SCCSs) [2, 3]. The transportation industry is the pioneer
domain, in which high levels of NNs (e.g., deep learning based networks) have
been used to developing self-driving cars [4]. Collision avoidance systems have
been developed for unmanned aircraft [5]. In this study, we refer to NN-based
SCCS as SCCS that heavily use NNs (e.g., to implement controller).
It is worth noting that several safety incidents caused by autonomous ve-
hicles have been presented in media, e.g., Uber car’s fatal incident [6], Tesla’s
fatal Autopilot crash [7], and Google’s self-driving car crash [8]. In addition
to the safety incidents caused by failures of the autonomous system, security
breaches of the autonomous vehicle can potentially lead to safety issues, e.g.,
a demo showed that autonomous vehicles can be remotely controlled and
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hijacked [9]. How can we ensure that a SCCS containing NN technology will
behave correctly and consistently when system failures or malicious attacks
occur?
Increasing interest in the migration of industrial control systems towards
SCCPSs has encouraged research in the area of safety analysis of SCCPSs.
Kriaa et al. [10] surveyed existing approaches for an integrated safety and
security analysis of industrial control systems. The approaches cover both
the design stage and the operational stage of the system lifecycle. Some
approaches (such as [11, 12]) are aimed at combing safety and security tech-
niques into a single methodology. Others (such as [13, 14]) are trying to
align safety and security techniques. These approaches are either generic,
which consider both safety and security at a very high level, or are model-
based, which rely on a formal or semi-formal representation of functional or
non-functional aspects of the system.
There are many studies that focus on the T&V of NNs in the past decade.
Several review articles [15, 16, 17, 18] on this topic have been published.
Studies [15, 19] have reviewed methods focusing on verification and valida-
tion of NNs for aerospace systems. Studies [17, 18] are limited in automotive
applications. None of these review articles has applied the Systematic Liter-
ature Review (SLR) approach. Recently there has been more concern about
Artificial Intelligence (AI) safety. The state-of-the-art advancements in the
T&V of NN-based SCCS is increasingly important; hence, there is a need
to have a thorough understanding of present studies to incentivize further
discussion. This study aimed to summarize the current research on T&V
methods for NN-based control software in SCCPSs.
We have systematically identified and reviewed 83 papers focusing on
T&V of NN-based SCCS and synthesized the data extracted from those
papers to answer three research questions.
• RQ1 What are the profiles of the studies focusing on testing and veri-
fying NN-based SCCSs?
• RQ2 What approaches and associated tools have been proposed to test
and verify NN-based SCCSs?
• RQ3 What are the limitations of current studies with respect to testing
and verifying NN-based SCCSs?
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To our best knowledge, our study is the first SLR [20] on testing and verifying
NN-based control software in SCCPSs. The results of these research ques-
tions can help researchers identify the research gaps in this area, and help
industrial practitioners choose proper verification and certification methods.
The main contributions of this work are:
• We made a classification of testing and verification approaches in both
academia and industry for NN-based SCCS.
• We identified and proposed challenges for advancing state-of-the-art
testing and verification for NN-based SCCS.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we
define terminologies related to NN-based SCCPSs and summarize related
work from academia and industry. Section 3 describes the SLR process and
the review protocol. The results of the research questions are reported in
Section 4. Section 5 discusses industry practice of T&V of NN-based SCCS,
and the threats to validity of our study. Section 6 concludes the study.
2. Background
2.1. Cyber-physical systems
As defined in [1], “cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are physical and engi-
neered systems whose operations are monitored, coordinated, controlled and
integrated by a computing and communication core.” Several other systems,
such as Internet of Things (IoTs) and Industrial Control Systems (ICS) have
very similar features compared to CPSs, since they are all systems used to
monitor and control the physical world with embedded sensor and actuator
networks. In general, CPSs are perceived as the new generation of embedded
control systems, which can involve IoTs and ICS [21, 22].
In this SLR, we adopted the CPS conceptual model in [23] as a high-level
abstraction of CPS to describe the different perspectives of CPS and the
potential interactions of devices and systems in a system of systems (SoS) as
shown in Fig. 1. From the perspective of unit level, CPS at least includes
one or several controllers, many actuators, and sensors. A CPS can also
be a system consists of one or more cyber-physical devices. From the SoS
perspective, a CPS is composed of multiple systems that include multiple
devices. In general, a CPS must contain the decision flow (from controller
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Figure 1: CPS conceptual model
to actuators), information flow (from sensors to controller), and action flow
(actuators impacting the physical state of the physical world).
In the context of safety critical CPS, safety and performance are depen-
dent on the system (to be more specific, the controller of the system) making
the right decision according to the measurement of the sensors, and operating
the actuators to take the right action at the right time. Thus, verification of
the process of decision-making is vital for a safety critical CPS.
2.2. Modern neural networks
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is the general name of comput-
ing systems designed to mimic how human brain processes information [24].
An ANN is composed of a collection of interconnected computation nodes
(namely artificial neurons), which are organized in layers. Depending on the
directions of the signal flow, ANN can have feed-forward or feedback architec-
tures. Fig. 2 shows a simplified feed-forward ANN architecture with multiple
hidden layers. Each artificial neuron has weighted inputs, activation function,
and one output. The weights of the interconnections are adjusted based on
the learning rules. There are three main models of learning rules, which are
unsupervised learning, supervised learning, and reinforcement learning. The
choice of learning rules corresponds to the particular learning task. The com-
mon activation functions contain sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent, radial bases
function (RBF), and piece-wise linear transfer function (such as ReLU: Rec-
tified Linear Unit [25]). In a word, an ANN can be defined by three factors:
the interconnection structure between different layers, activation function
type, and procedure for updating the weights.
Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP [26]) represents a class of feed-forward
ANN. An MLP consists of three typical classes of layers: input layer, hidden
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Figure 2: A simplified feed-forward ANN architecture
layer, and output layer. Each neuron of MLP in one layer is fully connected
with every node in the following layer. MLP employs backpropagation tech-
nique (which belongs to supervised learning) for training.
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs [27]) represents an ANN with multi-
ple hidden layers between the input and output layers. The major difference
between DNNs and shallow NNs is that researchers were able to train NNs
much deeper to find patterns with great performance even for complex non-
linear relationships.
Convolutional Deep Neural Networks (CNN [28]) is a type of deep
feed-forward network with one or more convolutional layers. CNN is superior
for processing two-dimensional data (particular camera images), because of
the convolution operations. CNN is now widely applied to develop partially-
autonomous and fully-autonomous vehicles.
A NN could be trained offline or online. A NN trained offline means it
only learns during development. After training, it will fix and act deter-
ministically. Therefore static verification methods should be practical. In
contrast, online training will allow the NN to keep learning and evolving
during operation, which requires run-time verification methods. In some ap-
plications, such as the Intelligent Flight Control System (IFCS) developed
by NASA [15], both offline and online training strategies are employed to
meet the system requirements.
In this SLR, we define an NN system to be any software system that
includes at least one NN component. The NNs are fundamentally different
with algorithmic programs, but a formal development methodology can still
be derived for an NN system. Development process of an NN system can
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include six phases [29]:
1. Formulation of requirements and goals;
2. Selection of training and test data sets;
3. Selection of the neural network architecture;
4. Training of the network;
5. Testing of the network; and
6. Acceptance and use by the customer.
Like [29], Falcini et al. introduced a similar development lifecycle for
DNN in automotive software [30] and proposed a W-model integrated data
development with standard software development to highlight the importance
of data-driven in DNN development. Falcini et al. [30] also summarized that
the DNN’s functional behavior is the collective result of its architectural
structure and its learning outcome through training.
2.3. The trends of using NN algorithm in SCCPSs
From 1940s automated range finders (developed by Norbert Wiener for
anti-aircraft guns) [31] to today’s self-driving cars, AI, especially NN algo-
rithms, is widely applied in both civilian (e.g., autonomous cars) and military
domains (e.g., drones). Boosted by the advances of AI, state-of-the-art CPS
can plan and execute more and more complex operations with less human
interaction. Here we present the applications of ANNs in the following four
representative SCCPSs.
2.3.1. Autonomous cars
For automobile, the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) proposed six
levels of autonomous driving[32]. A level 0 vehicle has no autonomous ca-
pabilities, and the human driver is responsible for all aspects of the driving
task. For level 5 vehicle, the driving tasks are only managed by the au-
tonomous driving system. When developing autonomous vehicles targeting
a high level of autonomy, one industry trend is to use DNN to implement
vehicle control algorithms. The deep-learning-based approach enables vehi-
cles to learn meaningful road features from raw input data automatically and
then output driving actions. The so-called end-to-end learning approach can
be applied to resolve complex real-world driving tasks. When using deep-
learning-based approaches, the first step is to use a large number of training
datasets (images or other sensor data) to train a DNN. Then a simulator
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is used to evaluate the performance of the trained network. After that, the
DNN-based autonomous vehicle will be able to “execute recognition, pre-
diction, and planning” driving tasks in diverse conditions [10]. Nowadays,
CNNs are the most widely adopted deep-learning model for fully autonomous
vehicles [5, 6, 7, 8]. NVIDIA introduced an AI supercomputer for autonomy
[33]. The development flow using NVIDIA DRIVE PX includes four stages:
1) data acquisition to train the DNN, 2) deployment of the output of a DNN
in a car, 3) autonomous application development, and 4) testing in-vehicle
or with simulation.
One essential characteristic of deep-learning-based autonomy is that the
decision-making part of the vehicle is almost a black box. This means that in
most cases, we as human drivers must trust the decisions made by the deep-
learning algorithms without knowing exactly why and how the decisions are
made.
2.3.2. Industrial control systems
Industrial Control System (ICS) is the general term for control systems,
also called Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.
ICSs make decisions based on the specific control law (such as look up ta-
ble and non-linear mathematical model) formulated by human designers.
In contrast to the classical design procedure of control law, reinforcement-
learning-based approaches learn the control law simply from the interaction
between the controller and the process, and then incrementally improving
control behaviour. Such approaches and ANN have been used in process
control two decades ago [34]. Concerning the recent progress in AI and the
success of DNN in making complex decisions, there are high expectations
for the application of DNN in ICSs. For instance, DNN and reinforcement
learning can be combined to develop continuous control [35]. Spielberg et al.
extended the work in [35] to design control policy for process control [36].
Even though the proposed approach in [36] is only tested on linear systems,
it shows a practical solution for applying DNN in non-linear ICSs.
2.3.3. Smart grid systems
The smart grid is designed as the next generation of electric power system,
depend on Information communications technology (ICT). There is tremen-
dous initiative of research activities in automated smart grid applications,
such as FLISR (which is a smart grid multi-agent automoation architecture
based on decentralized intelligent decision-making nodes) [37]. NN has been
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considered for solving many pattern recognition and optimization problems,
such as fault diagnosis [38], control and estimation of flux, speed [2], and
economical electricity distribution to consumers. MLP is one of the most
commonly used topology in power electronics and motor drives [2].
2.3.4. Healthcare
Medical devices is another emerging area where research and industry
practitioners are seeking to integrate AI technologies to improve accuracy
and automation. ANN and other machine learning approach (e.g., reinforce-
ment learning) have been proposed to improve the control algorithmes for
diabetes treatment in recent decades [39, 40]. In 2017, an AI-powered de-
vice for automated and continuous delivery of basal insulin (named MiniMed
670G system [41]) was approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). In the same year, it was reported that GE Healthcare had integrated
the NVIDIA AI platform into their CT scanner to improve the speed and
accuracy for the detection of liver and kidney lesions [42]. Using deep learn-
ing solution, such as CNN, in the medical computing field has proven to
be effective since CNN has excellent performance in object recognition and
localization in medical images [43].
2.4. Testing and verification of safety-critical control software
IEC 61508 and ISO 26262 are two standards highly relevance with the
testing and verification of SCCS. IEC 61508 is an international standard
concerning Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic
safety-related systems. It defined four safety integrity levels (SILs) for safety-
critical systems [44]. The higher the safety integrity level a SCCPS requires,
the more time and effort for verification are needed. In IEC 61508, formal
methods are highly recommended techniques for verifying high SIL systems.
Because formal methods can be used to construct the specification and pro-
vide a mathematical proof that the system matches some formal require-
ments, this is quite a strong commitment for correctness of a system.
ISO 26262, titled Road vehicles functional safety, is an international
standard for the functional safety of electrical and/or electronic systems in
production automobiles [45]. Besides using classical safety analysis methods
such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), ISO 26262 explicilty states that the production of a safety case is
mandated to assure system safety. It defines a safety case as an argument that
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the safety requirements for an item are complete and satisfied by evidence
compiled from work products of the safety activities during development [45].
The development of suitable approaches, which can verify the system
behavior and misbehavior of a safety-critical CPS is always challenging. Not
to mention that the architecture of NNs (especially DNN) makes it even
harder to decipher how the algorithmic decisions were made. The current
version of IEC 61508 is not applicable for the verification of NN-based SCCS
because AI technologies are not recommended there. The latest version of
ISO 26262 and its extension, ISO/PAS 21448, which is also known as safety
of the intended functionality (SOTIF) [46], will likely provide a way to handle
the development of autonomous vehicles. However, SOTIF will only provide
guidelines associated with SAE Level 0-2 autonomous vehicles [47], which
are not ready for the verification of NN-based autonomous vehicles.
In practice, in order to reduce test and validation costs, high-fidelity
simulation is a commonly used approach in the automotive domain. The
purpose of using a simulator is to predict the behavior of an autonomous
car in a mimicked environment. NVIDIA and Apollo distributed their high-
fidelity simulation platforms for testing autonomous vehicles. CARLA [48]
and Udacity’s Self-Driving Car Simulator [49] are two popular open-source
simulators for autonomous driving research and testing.
3. Research method
We conducted our SLR by following the SLR guidelines in [20] as well as
consulting other relevant guidelines in [50] and [51, 52]. Our review protocol
consisted of four parts: 1) search strategy, 2) inclusion and exclusion criteria,
3) selection process, and 4) data extraction and synthesis.
3.1. Search strategy
Based on guidelines provided in [20], we use the Population, Intervention,
Comparison, Outcome, Context (PICOC) criteria to formulate search terms.
In this SLR,
• The population should be an application area (e.g., general cyber-
physical system) or specific CPS (e.g., self-driving car).
• The intervention is methodology, tool and technology that addresses
system/component testing or verification.
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• The outcome is the improved safety or functional safety of CPSs.
• The context is the NN-based SCCPSs in which the testing and verifi-
cation take place.
• The comparison is the methodology, tool and technology with which
the intervention is being compared. We omitted it because it is not
relevant to our study.
Fig. 3 shows the search terms formulated based on the PICOC criteria.
We first used these search terms to run a series of trial searches and verify the
relevance of the resulting papers. We then revised the search string to form
the final search terms. The final search terms were composed of synonyms
and related terms.
Population: “Cyber-physical system*” or “Cyber physical 
system*” or CPS* or “Smart grid” or “Smart car” or “Automotive 
cyber-physical system*” or “Self-driving car*” or “Autonomous 
vehicle*” or “Autonomous driving system*” or “Automotive 
electronic control system*” or “Automotive embedded system*”
Context: “Deep learning” or “Deep neural networks” or 
“Autonomous decision” or “Autonomous agent*”
Intervention: “Safety” or “Functional safety”
Outcome: “Risk assessment” or “verification” or “test” or ”testing” 
or “analysis” or “Certification” or “assurance”
TITLE-ABS-KEY(("Cyber-physical system*" or "Cyber-physical 
system*" or CPS* or "Smart grid" or "Smart car" or "Automotive 
cyber-physical system*" or "Self-driving car*" or "Autonomous 
vehicle*" or "Autonomous driving system*" or "Automotive 
electronic control system*" or "Automotive embedded system*" or 
"Unmanned Aerial Vehicles" or "aircraft collision avoidance 
system*")AND(“Risk assessment” or “verification” or “test” or 
” t e s t i n g ” o r “ a n a l y s i s ” o r “ C e r t i f i c a t i o n ” o r 
“ a s s u r a n c e ” ) A N D ( “ S a f e t y ” o r “ F u n c t i o n a l 
safety”)AND(“Autonomous decision” or “Autonomous agent*” or 
“Deep learning” or “Deep neural networks”)
Figure 3: Search terms
We execute automated searches in six digital libraries, namely Scopus,
IEEE Xplore, Compendex EI, ACM Digital library, SpringerLink, and Web
of Science (ISI).
3.2. Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Table 1 presents our inclusion and exclusion criteria. We set three inclu-
sion criteria to restrict the application domain, context, and outcome type.
We excluded papers that were not peer-reviewed, such as keynotes, books,
and dissertations, and paper not written in English. It should be clarified
that, unlike most other SLR studies, we did not directly exclude short papers
(less than six pages), work-in-progress papers, and pre-print papers. The rea-
son is that this research area is far from mature, so many initial thoughts or
in-progress papers are still valuable to review.
11
Table 1: Inclusion and Exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria
I1 The paper must have a context in SCCPSs, either in general or in a specific application domain
I2 The paper must be aimed at testing/verification approaches for NN-based SCCS
I3 The paper must be aimed at modern neural network
Exclusion criteria
E1 Papers not peer-reviewed
E2 Not written in English
E3 Full-text is not available
E4 Not relevant to modern neural network
3.3. Selection process
We used the inclusion and exclusion criteria to filter the papers in the
following steps. We covered papers from 2001 to November 2018. Fig. 4
shows the whole search and filtering process.
Stage1: Ran the search string on the six digital libraries and retrieved
1046 papers. After removing those duplicated papers, we had 950 papers.
Stage2: Excluded studies by reading title and keywords. If it was not
excluded simply by reading title and keywords, the paper was kept for further
investigation. At the end of this stage, we selected 254 papers.
Stage3: Further filtered the papers by reading abstracts and found 105
potential papers with high relevance to the research goal of our SLR.
Stage4: Read the introduction and conclusion to decide our selection
(42 papers). We recorded the reasons for exclusion for each excluded paper.
We excluded the papers that were irrelevant, or whose full texts were not
available. Furthermore, we critically examined the quality of primary studies
to exclude those that lacked of sufficient information.
Stage5: Read full text of the selected studies from the fourth phase,
applied snowballing by scanning the reference of the selected papers. To
limit the scope of the snowballing, we only covered references published in
the last 8 years. From snowballing, we found 41 new relevant papers.
Finally, we selected 83 papers as primary studies for detailed analysis.
We listed all of the selected studies in Appendix A. The first author has
conducted the selection process with face-to-face discussions with the second
authors. The second author performed a cross-check of each step and read
all the final selected papers to confirm the selection of the papers.
3.4. Data extraction and synthesis
Data Extraction: We extracted two kinds of information from the se-
lected papers. To answer RQ1, we extracted information for statistical anal-
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Step 1
Data Sources: Scopus, IEEE Xplore, Compendex EI, 
ACM Digital library, SpringerLink, and Web of 
Science(ISI)
N=950
Step 2
Apply inclusion and exclusion criteria by reading 
title and keywords
N=254
Step 3
Apply inclusion and exclusion criteria by reading 
abstract
N=105
Step 4
Apply inclusion and exclusion criteria by reading 
introduction and conclusion
N=42
Step 5
Snowballing: Read full paper got in 4th step and 
scan the reference 
N=83
Figure 4: Search process
ysis, e.g., publication year and research type. To answer RQ2 and RQ3,
we collected information to identify key features (such as research goal, tech-
nique and tools, major contribution and limitation) of testing and verification
approaches.
Synthesis: We use descriptive statistics to analyze the data for answering
RQ1. To answer RQ2 and RQ3, we analyzed the data using the qualitative
analysis method by following the five steps of the thematic analysis [53]: 1)
extracting data, 2) coding data, 3) translating codes into themes, 4) creating
a model of higher-order themes, and 5) assessing the trustworthiness of the
synthesis.
4. Result
4.1. RQ1. What are the profiles of the studies focusing on testing and veri-
fying NN-based SCCSs?
Studies distributions: Fig. 5 shows the distribution of selected papers
based on publication year and the types of work. There are 68 papers (81.9%)
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published since 2016, indicating that researchers are paying more attention
to testing and verification of NN-based SCCSs. Conference was the most
popular publication type with 48 papers (57.8%), followed by pre-print (25
papers, 30.1%), workshop (6 papers, 7.2%) and journal (4 papers, 4.8%).
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Pre-print 0 0 1 0 1 0 10 3
Workshop 0 0 0 1 1 0 3 1
Journal 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Conference 1 0 0 2 2 7 14 8
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Figure 5: Publication year and types of selected papers
We also investigated the geographic distribution of the reviewed studies.
It allowed us to identify which countries are leading the research in this do-
main. We considered a study to be conducted in one country if the affiliation
of at least one author is in this country. Moreover, the involvement of indus-
try would be an indicator of industry’s interest in this domain. We classified
the reviewed papers as industry, if at least one author came from industry
or the study used real-world systems to test/verify the proposed approach.
A paper will be categorized as academia if all authors come from academia.
Fig. 6 shows that researchers based in the USA have been involved in the
most primary studies for testing or verification of NN-based SCCSs with 56
publications, followed by the researchers based in Germany and the UK with
10 and 9 publications, respectively. It is worth noting that 47 of 83 (56.6%)
publications have involvement from industry.
Research types: We classified the selected papers into five research
types: validation research, evaluation research, solution proposal, philosoph-
ical paper, and opinion paper, based on the criterion proposed by Kai et al.
[50]. In [50], a set of conditions (“Used in practice”, “Novel solution”, “Em-
pirical evaluation”, “Conceptual framework”, “Opinion about something”,
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Figure 6: Geographic distribution of selected papers
“Authors’s experience”) are presented in a decision table to determine which
research type a study belongs to. Both evaluation research and validation re-
search have to present empirical evaluation. The difference is that validation
is not used in practice (e.g., experimental or simulation-based approaches),
whereas, evaluation studies should be conducted in a real-world context. So-
lution proposal means that it has to propose a new solution that may or may
not be used in practice. The meaning of opinion paper, which is straightfor-
ward like the name, is to address opinions about something. Fig. 7 shows that
evaluation and validation research are the majority of the selected papers,
corresponding to 31.3% (26 papers) and 61.4% (51 papers) of the selected
papers, respectively. The low percentage of the solution proposal (5 papers)
and opinion paper (1 paper) was not surprising because a majority of the
reviewed papers presented and demonstrated their testing and verification
approaches through academic and industrial case studies, simulation, and
controlled experiments. Philosophical papers do not exist in selected studies
because we do not include papers that only propose a conceptual framework
(that is the key criterion of categorizing philosophical paper).
Application domains: We analyzed the application domain of selected
studies to provide useful information for researchers and practitioners who
are interested in the domain-specific aspects of the approaches. The results
are shown in Table 2. We found that considerable effort is now being put
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Figure 7: Research type of selected papers
into using NN algorithms to accomplish control logic for general purpose (59
papers, 71.1%), automotive CPSs, such as autonomous vehicles (13 papers,
15.7), and autonomous aerial systems, such as airborne collision avoidance
systems for unmanned aircraft (5 papers, 6%).
Table 2: Distribution of application domains of the selected studies
Application domain No. of studies
General SCCPSs 59
Automotive CPSs 13
Autonomous aerial systems 5
Robot system 5
Health care 1
4.2. RQ2. What approaches and associated tools have been proposed to test
and verify NN-based SCCSs?
As 4 of the 83 papers focused mainly on high-level ideas and concepts
without presenting detailed approaches or tools, we did not include them to
answer RQ2. For the remaining 79 out of 83 (95.2%) papers, we applied
the thematic analysis approach [53] and identified five high-order themes
and some sub-themes. Table 3 presents the themes, sub-themes, and the
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corresponding papers. Fig. 8 compares the interests difference of academia
and industry for the five identified themes.
Table 3: A classification of approaches to test and verify NN-based SCCS
Themes Sub-themes Papers #
Assuring robustness of NNs
Understanding characteristics and impacts of
adversarial examples
[54],[55],[56],[57],[58], [59], [60] 17
Detect adversarial examples [61],[62], [63], [64], [65], [66]
Mitigate impact of adversarial examples [67], [68]
Improving robustness of NN through using
adversarial examples
[69], [70]
Improving failure resilience
of NN
[71],[72],[73],[74],[75],[76],[77],[78],[79],[80],[81] 11
Measuring and ensuring test
completeness
[82],[83],[84],[85],[86],[87],[88] 7
Assuring safety properties
of NN-based CPSs
[89],[90],[91],[92],[93],[94],[95],[96],[97],
[98],[99],[100],[101]
13
Improving interpretability
of NN
Understand how a specific decision is made
[102],[103],[104],[105],[106],[107],[108],[109],
[110],[111],[112],[113],[114],[115],[116], [117],
[118],[119],[120]
Facilitate understanding of internal logic of
NN
[121],[122],[123],[124],[125],[126] 31
Visualizing internal layers of NN to help
identify errors in NN
[127],[128],[129],[130],[131],[132]
4.2.1. CA1: Assuring robustness of NNs
One high-order theme of the studies is to assure the robustness of NNs.
Robustness of a NN is its ability to cope with erroneous inputs. The erro-
neous inputs can be an adversarial example (i.e., an input that adds small
perturbation intentionally to mislead classification of NN), or benign but
wrong input data. Methods under such theme can be further classified into
four sub-themes.
Studies focusing on understanding characteristics and impacts
of adversarial examples. Some studies tried to identify characteristics and
impacts of adversarial examples. The study [55] found the characteristics,
such as the linear nature, of adversarial examples. The study [57] measured
impact of adversarial examples by counting their frequencies and severities.
Nguyen et al. in [54] found that a CNN trained on ImageNet [133] is vul-
nerable to adversarial examples generated through Evolutionary Algorithms
(EAs) or gradient ascent.
A few other studies, such as [56, 58, 59, 60], tried to understand the char-
acteristics of robust NNs. Cisse et al. in [58] introduced a particular form of
DNN, namely Parseval Networks, that is intrinsically robust to adversarial
noise. Gu et al. in [60] concluded that some training strategies, for example,
training using adversarial examples, or imposing contractive penalty layer
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Figure 8: Comparing the interests difference of academia and industry
by layer, are robust to certain structures of adversarial examples (e.g., in-
puts corrupted by Gaussian additive noises or blurring). Higher-confidence
adversarial examples (i.e., adversarial instances that are extremely easy to
classify into the wrong category) were used to evaluate the robustness of
state-of-the-art NN in [59] and robot-vision system in [56].
Studies focusing on methods to detect adversarial examples.
Detecting adversarial examples that are already inserted into training or
testing data set are the primary targets of [61, 63, 64, 65, 66]. Wicker et
al. in [61] and [65] formulated the adversarial examples detection as a two-
player stochastic game and used the Monte Carlo Tree Search to identify
adversarial examples. Reuben [63] applied density estimates, and Bayesian
uncertainty estimates to detect adversarial samples. Xu et al. [64] proposed
a feature squeezing framework to detect adversarial examples, which are
generated by seven state-of-the-art methods. According to [64], an advantage
of feature squeezing is that it did not change the underlying model; therefore,
it can easily be integrated with other defenses methods. Metzen et al. [66]
embedded DNNs with a subnetwork (called “detector”) to detect adversarial
perturbations. The Deepsafe presented in [62] used clustering technology
to find candidate-safe regions first and then verified whether the candidates
were safe using counter-examples as a proof.
Studies focusing on methods to mitigate impact of adversarial
examples. Papemot et al. [67] adopted defensive distillation as a defense
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strategy to train DNN-based classifiers against adversarial examples. How-
ever, several powerful attacks have been proposed to defeat defensive distil-
lation and have demonstrated that defensive distillation does not actually
eliminate adversarial examples [59]. Papemot et al.[68] revisited defensive
distillation and proposed a more effective way to defend against three re-
cently discovered attacks strategies, i.e., the Fast Gradient Method (FGM)
[55], the Jacobian Saliency Map Approach (JSMA) [134], and AdaDelta op-
timization strategy (AdaDelta) [59].
Studies focusing on increasing robustness of NN through us-
ing adversarial examples. In studies [69] and [70], the authors proposed
methods to leverage adversarial training (e.g., generating a large amount of
adversarial examples and then training the NN not to be fooled by these
adversarial examples) to increase robustness of NN.
4.2.2. CA2: Improving failure resilience of NNs
Studies under this theme focus on improving the resilience of NNs, so
that the NN-based CPSs is more tolerant of against possible hardware and
software failures.
Studies [73, 75, 76] investigated error detection and mitigation mecha-
nism, while studies [74, 78] focused on understanding error propagation in
DNN accelerators. Vialatte et al. [73] demonstrated that faulty compu-
tations can be addressed by increasing the size of NN. Santos et al. [75]
proposed an algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) strategy to detect and
correct radiation-induced errors. In [76], a binary classification algorithm
based on temporal and stereo inconsistencies was applied to identify errors
caused by single frame object detectors. Li et al. [74] developed a general-
purpose GPU (GPGPU) fault injection tool called LLFI-GPU (LLFI is a
fault injector tool based on the LLVM compiler [135]) to investigate error
propagation patterns in twelve GPGPU applications. Later, Li et al. [78]
revealed that the error resilience of a DNN accelerators depends on the data
types, values, data reuse, and the types of layers in the design. Based on this
finding, they formulated guidelines for designing resilient DNN systems and
proposed two efficient DNN protection techniques, namely Symptom-based
Error Detectors (SED) and Selective Latch Hardening (SLH) to mitigate soft
errors that are typically caused by high-energy particles in hardware systems
[136].
The study [79] characterized the faults propagation through an open-
source AV control software (i.e., openpilot) to assess the failure resilience
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of the system. Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) [137] hazard
analysis technique was used to guide fault injection. Existing work in [79]
showed that STPA is suited for an in-depth identification of unsafe scenarios,
and thus, the fault injection space was reduced.
Based on the diversified redundancy strategies, the study [80] developed
diverse networks in the context of different training dataset, different network
parameters, and different classification mechanisms to strengthen the fault
tolerant of the DNN architecture.
Studies [71, 72] tried to improve computation efficiency without compro-
mising error resilience. Studies [71, 72] also predicted the error resilience of
DNN accelerators to make reconfigurable NN accelerators. The study [71]
demonstrated a more accurate neuron resilience assignment than state-of-
the-art techniques and provided the possibility of moving parts of the neuron
computations to unreliable hardware at the given quality constraint. Zhang
et al. [72] proposed a framework to increase efficiency of computation by
approximating the computation of certain less critical neurons. Daftry et al.
[81] provided an interesting idea about “how to enable a robot to know when
it does not know?”. The idea of [81] is to utilize the resulting features of the
controller, which are learned from a CNN to predict the failure of the con-
troller, and then let the system self-evaluate and decide whether to execute
or discard an action.
4.2.3. CA3: Measuring and ensuring test completeness
The approaches and tools under this theme aim to ensure good cover-
age of testing NNs. The testing approaches include black-box testing (i.e.,
focusing on whether the tests cover all possible usage scenarios), white-box
testing (i.e., focusing on whether the tests cover every neuron in the NN) and
metamorphic testing, which focuses on both test case generation and result
verification [138].
O’Kelly et al. [82] proposed methods to ensure good usage coverage
through first making a formal Scenario Description Language (SDL) to cre-
ate driving scenarios, and then translating the scenarios to a specification-
guided automatic test generation tool named S-TALIRO to generate and run
the tests. Raj et al. [85] proved the possibility of speeding up the generation
of new and interesting counterexamples by introducing fuzzing patterns ob-
tained from an unrelated DNN on a different image database, although the
proposed method provides no guarantee of test completeness.
DeepXplore [83] first introduced neuron coverage as testing metric for
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DNNs, and then used multiple different DNNs with similar functionality
as cross-referencing oracles to identify erroneous corner cases. Compared to
[83], DeepTest [84] and DLFuzz [88] aimed at maximizing the neuron coverage
without requiring multiple DNNs. The study [84] used neuron coverage for
guiding test generation in a single DNN and leveraged metamorphic relations
to identify erroneous behaviors. The study [88] proposed a differential fuzzing
testing framework to generate adversarial inputs without cross-referencing.
However, methods proposed in [83, 84, 88] cannot guarantee generating test
cases that can precisely reflect real-world cases (e.g., driving scenes in various
weather conditions when taking a DNN-based autonomous driving system).
DeepRoad [87] employed Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) based tech-
nique and metamorphic testing to synthesize diverse real driving scenes, and
to test inconsistent behaviors in DNN-based autonomous driving systems.
In contrast to earlier works, DeepGauge [86] argued that testing criteria for
traditional software are no longer applicable for DNNs. Ma et al. [86] pro-
posed neuron-level and layer-level coverage criteria for testing DNNS and for
measuring the testing quality.
4.2.4. CA4: Assuring safety property of NN-based SCCPSs
Formal verification can provide a mathematical proof that a system satis-
fies some desired safety properties (e.g., the system should always stay within
some allowed region, namely safe region). The formal verification usually
present the NN as models and then apply model checker, such as Boolean
satisfiability (SAT) solvers (e.g., Chaff [139], SATO [140], GRASP [141])
to verify the safety property. Pulina et al. [91] developed NeVer (Neural
networks Verifier), which solves Boolean combinations of linear arithmetic
constraints, to verify safe regions of MLP. Through adopting abstraction-
refinement mechanism, NeVer can verify real-world MLPs automatically. As
an extension experiment analysis of results of [91], Pulina et al. [89] compared
performance (e.g., competition-style and scalability) of state-of-art Satisfia-
bility Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers [142], and demonstrated that scalabil-
ity and fine-grained abstractions remain challenges for realistic size networks.
The studies [90] and [96] verified the “feed-forward NNs with piece-wise linear
activation functions” by encoding verification problems into solving a linear
approximation exploring network behavior in SMT solver. Mhamdi et al.
in [77] theoretically and empirically proved that the key parameters can be
used to estimate the robustness of a NN are: “Lipschitz coefficient of the
activation function, distribution of large synaptic weights, and depth of the
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network.”
The next generation of collision avoidance systems for unmanned aircraft
(ACAS Xu) adopted DNN to compress large score table [5]. Julian et al.
[94] explored the performance of ACAS Xu by measuring a set of safety
and performance metrics. Simulation in study [94] shows that the system
based on DNNs performed as correctly as the original large score table but
with better performance. Reluplex [96] had successfully been used to verify
the safety property of a DNN for the prototype of ACAS Xu. Although
the outcomes of Reluplex [96] are limited to verify the correctness of neural
network with specific type of activation functions, such as ReLUs or max-
pooling layers, the study sheds a light on which types of neural network
architectures are easier to verify, and thus paves the way for verifying real-
world DNN-based controllers.
The method proposed in studies [98] and [99] verified that Binarized Neu-
ral Networks (BNNs) is efficient and is scalable to moderate-sized BNNs.
Study [98] verified robustness of DNNs to adversarial perturbations using
an exact Boolean encoding of the network. In study [99], BNNs and its
input-output specifications were transferred into equivalence hardware cir-
cuits. The equivalence hardware circuits consists of a BNN structure module
and a BNN property module. The authors of [99] then applied SAT solver
to verify the properties (e.g., simultaneously classify an image as a priority
road sign and as a stop sign with high confidence) of the BNN in order to
identify the risk behavior of BNN.
One fundamental property to verify a SCCS is to make sure that it will
never violate a safety property, such as making the system reaching an unsafe
region. An unsafe region means a region that is beyond the safety specifi-
cation. The main ideas of studies under this sub-theme are to calculate the
output reachable set of MLP, such as in studies [93] and [95], or DNN in
study [92], to verify if unsafe regions will be reached. Xiang et al. [95] pro-
posed a layer-by-layer approach to compute the output reachable set assisted
by polyhedron computation tools. The safety verification of a ReLU MLP
is turned into checking if non-empty intersection exists between the output
reachable set and the unsafe regions. In a later work of Xiang et al. [93], they
introduced maximum sensitivity to perform a simulation-based reachable set
estimation with few restrictions on the activation functions. By combining
local search and linear programming problems, Dutta et al. [92] developed
an output bound searching approach for DNN with ReLU activation func-
tions, which is implemented in a tool called SHERLOCK to check whether
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the unsafe region is reached. Study [97] focused on the safety verification of
image classification decisions. In [97], Huang et al. employed discretization
to enable a finite exhaustive search for adversarial misclassifications. If no
misclassifications are found in all layers after the exhaustive search, the NN
is regarded as safe.
The idea of [100] is to formulate the formal verification of temporal logic
properties of a CPS with Machine Learning (ML) components as the falsifi-
cation problem (finding a counterexample that does not satisfy system spec-
ification). The study [100] adopted a ML analyzer to abstract the feature
space of ML components (which approximately represents the ML classifiers).
The identified misclassifying features are then used to drive the process of
falsification. The introduction of the ML analyzer narrowed down the search-
ing space for counterexamples and established a connection between the ML
component and the rest of the system.
Another direction to make sure the system will not violate safety prop-
erties is to use run-time monitoring. The study [101] envisioned an ap-
proach(WISEML), which combines reinforcement learning and run-time mon-
itoring technique, to detect invariants violations. The purpose of this work
is to create a safety envelope around the NN-based SCCPSs.
4.2.5. CA5: Improving interpretability of NNs
NNs have proved to be effective ways to generalize the relationship be-
tween inputs and outputs. As the models of NN are learned from training
dataset without human intervention, the relationship between inputs and
outputs of NN is like a black box. Due to the black-box nature of NNs, it is
difficult for people to understand and explain how a NN works. Studies un-
der this theme focus on facilitating the understanding on how NNs generate
outputs from inputs. Studies in this theme can be classified into the follow-
ing three sub-themes, which although may not mutually exclusive. However,
this can be a way to capture the different motivations for the interpretability
of NNs.
Studies focusing on understanding how a specific decision is
made. This line of work mainly focuses on providing explanations for indi-
vidual prediction (also defined as local interpretability). One study is called
Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME) [128]. LIME can
approximate the original NN model locally to provide an explaination for a
specific prediction of interest. The problem of LIME is that it assumes the
local linearity of the classification boundary, which is not true for most com-
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plex NNs. The creators of LIME later extended their work by introducing
high-precision rules (i.e., if-then rules), which they called anchors [103]. The
study [129] developed an explanation system (LEMNA) for security applica-
tions and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs). LEMNA can locally approx-
imate a non-linear classification boundary and handle feature dependency
problems, and therefore is able to provide a high fidelity explanation.
In the case of an image classifier, it is also common to use gradient mea-
surement to estimate the importance value of each pixel for the final clas-
sification. DeepLIFT [114], Integrated Gradients [104], and more recently,
SmoothGrad [119] fall in this category. The study [120] proposed a unified
framework, SHapley Additive exPlanations (SHAP) by integrating six exist-
ing methods (LIME [121], DeepLIFT [114], Layer-Wise Relevance Propaga-
tion, Shapley regression values, Shapley sampling values, and Quantitative
Input Influence) to measure feature importance.
Several approaches attempted to decomposed the classification decision
(output) into the contributions of individual components of an input based on
specific local decomposition rules (i.e., Pixel-Wise decomposition [105, 115],
and deep Taylor decomposition [107]).
Szegedy et al. [102] investigated the semantic meaning of individual units
and the stability of DNN while small perturbations were added to the input.
They pointed out that the individual neurons did not contained the semantic
information, while the entire space of activations does. They also experimen-
tally proved that the same small perturbation of input can cause different
DNN models (e.g., trained with different hyperparameters) generate wrong
predictions.
There are several methods for improving local explanations for NN mod-
els compared to the above-mentioned approaches. The study [112] argued
that explanation approaches for NN models should provide sound theoretical
support. Another work Ross et al. [117] presented their idea as “Right for the
right reasons”, which means that the output of NN models should be right
with the right explanation. In this work, incorrect explanations for particu-
lar inputs can be identified and NN models can be guided to learn alternate
explanations. Both [112, 116] made efforts on real-time explanations since
their approaches can generate accurate explanations quickly enough.
Studies focusing on facilitating understanding of the internal
logic of NN. Studies in this sub-theme are also known as global inter-
pretability. To help interpret how NN models work, model distillation is
used in [121], [122], [123], and [125]. The initial intention of distillation was
24
to reduce the computational cost. For example, Hinton et al. [123] distilled a
collection of DNN models into a single model to facilitate deployment. The
knowledge distilled from NN models has later been applied for interpretabil-
ity. Some studies compressed information (e.g., decision rules) from deep
learning models into transparent models such as decision trees [121, 130] and
gradient boosting trees [122] to mimic the performance of models. Others
tended to explain the inner workings of NN models through analyzing the
feature space. Study [125] distilled the relationship between input features
and model predictions (outputs of the model) as a feature shape to evaluate
the feature contribution to the model. Another attempt to produce global
interpretability is to reveal the features learned by each neuron. For example,
in [126], the authors leveraged deep generator networks to synthesized the in-
put (i.e., image) that highly activates a neuron. Dong et al. [109] adopted an
attentive encoder decoder network to learn interpretable features, and then
proposed a algorithm called prediction difference maximization to interpret
the features learned by each neuron.
One interesting work [118] used an additional neural network module that
is fit for relational reasoning to reason the relations between the input and
response of the NN models. There is also another promising line of work that
combined local and global interpretability (e.g., [108], [113]) to explain NN
models.
Studies focusing on visualizing internal layers of NN to help
identify errors in NN. In study [127], activities, such as the operation
of the classifier and the function of intermediate feature layers within the
CNN model, were visualized by using a multi-layered deconvolutional net-
work (named DeconvNet). These visualizations are useful to interpret model
problems. Unlike [127], which visually depicted neurons in a convolutional
layer, the study [106] visualized neurons in a fully connected layer. Zhou
et al. [111] proposed Class Activation Mapping (CAM) for CNNs to visualize
the discriminative object parts on any given image. Fong and Vedaldi [110]
highlighted the most responsible part of an image for a decision by perturbing
meaningful images. DarkSight [124] combined the ideas of model distillation
and visualization to visualize the prediction of a NN model. Thiagarajan
et al. [131] built a TreeView representation via feature-space partitioning to
interpret the prediction of NN. Mahendran and Vedaldi [132] reconstructed
semantic information (images) in each layer of CNNs by using information
from the image representation.
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4.3. RQ3. What are the limitations of current research with respect to testing
and verifying NN-based SCCS?
Analyzing failure modes and how the system reacts to failures are crucial
parts of the safety analysis, especially in safety-critical domains. When test-
ing and verifying the safety of NN-based SCCPSs, we need to rethink how to
perform failure mode and effect analysis, how to analyze inter-dependencies
between sub-systems of a SCCPSs, and how to analyze the resilience of the
system. We need to ensure that even if some of the system’s hardware or
software do not behave as expected, the system can sense the risk, avoid the
risk before the incident, and mitigate the risk effectively when an incident
happens. Looking into Testing and Verification (T&V) activities through
software development, the ideal situation is that we would: find appropriate
T&V methods to verify whether the design and implement are consistent
with the requirements; construct complete test criteria and test oracle; and
generate test data and test any objects (such as code modules, data struc-
tures) that are necessary for the correct development of software [143]. Un-
fortunately, the fact is that complete T&V is hard to guarantee. In order
to investigate the gap between industry needs for T&V of NN-based SCCPS
and state-of-the-art T&V methods, we performed a mapping of identified
approaches to the relevant standard.
4.3.1. Mapping of reviewed approaches to the software safety lifecycles in
IEC 61508
An increased interest in the application of NN within safety-critical do-
mains has encouraged research in the area of T&V of NN-based SCCSs.
Research institutions and industry T&V practitioners are working on differ-
ent aspects of this problem. However, we have not found strong connections
between those potential usefulness methods for T&V of NNs and relevant
safety standards (such as IEC 61508 [44] and ISO 26262 [45]).
We hereby adopt IEC 61508 [44] as a reference standard to execute the
mapping analysis since ISO 26262 [45] is the adaptation of IEC 61508 [44].
We found that the major T&V activities listed in the software safety lifecycles
of IEC 61508-3 (including: evaluation of software architecture design, soft-
ware module testing and integration, programmable electronics integration,
and software verification) are still valid when conducting T&V for NN-based
SCCSs. But for most of them, new techniques/measures for supporting the
T&V of NN-based software are demanded. Therefore, we decided to employ
safety integrity properties (which are explained in IEC 61508-3 Annex C and
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Annex F of IEC 61508-7) as indicators to justify to what extent these desir-
able properties have been achieved by state-of-the-art methods for T&V of
NN-based SCCSs. The detailed mapping information can be found in Table
4.
Table 4: A mapping of reviewed approaches to IEC 61508 safety
life cycle
Phase Property
Relevant primary
studies
C
a
te
g
o
ry
Remaining challenges
Software Completeness None N/A
architecture
design
Correctness [94] CA4 Training process of NN-
based algorithm is time-
consuming.
Freedom
from intrin-
sic faults
[55, 57, 58, 60, 64],
[66] - [70]
CA1 ¶ Limited to specific
model classes, or tasks
(e.g., image classifier), or
small size NNs [57]; ·
Not immune to adver-
sarial adaptation [64]; ¸
Lack of understanding on
how system can be free
from different kinds of at-
tacks other than adversar-
ial examples.
Understand-
ability
[102] - [132] CA5 ¶ Limited to specific
model classes, or tasks
(e.g., image classifier), or
small size NN models
[121]; · Not able to
provide real-time explana-
tions; ¸ Lack of evalua-
tion method for the expla-
nation of NN.
Verifiable
and testable
design
[82] CA3 ¶ Lack of integrated
computer- aided
toolchains to support
the verification activities;
· Limited to specific
models, tasks or NN size;
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
Phase Property
Relevant primary
studies
C
a
te
g
o
ry
Remaining challenges
[90] CA4 ¶ Limited to specific
NN architectures (i.e.,
piece-wise linear acti-
vation functions), need
better understanding
of NN architectures; ·
Trade-off between efficient
verification and linear ap-
proximation of the NN
behavior is not studied
sufficiently.
Fault
tolerance
[72, 73, 77,
80, 81]
CA2 ¶ Decouple the fault tol-
erance from the classifica-
tion performance [73]; ·
Lack of studies on unex-
pected environmental fail-
ures.
Defense
against com-
mon cause
failure
None N/A
Software module
testing and
integration
Completeness [59, 70, 97] CA1 Lack of comprehensive cri-
teria to evaluate testing
adequacy.
[83] - [88] CA3 Low fidelity of testing
cases compared with real-
world cases [84].
Correctness
[54, 56, 59, 61, 62]
[63, 65]
CA1 ¶ Vulnerable to the vari-
ation of adversarial exam-
ples; · Limited to specific
NN model classes or tasks.
[76] CA2 Insufficient validation of
input raw data.
Repeatability [82, 83, 84] CA3 Testing cases generated by
automated tools may be
biased.
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Table 4 – continued from previous page
Phase Property
Relevant primary
studies
C
a
te
g
o
ry
Remaining challenges
Precisely de-
fined testing
configura-
tion
None N/A
Programm-
able electronics
integration
(hardware
and software)
Completeness None N/A
Correctness [71, 74, 75,
78]
CA2 Insufficient testing of
hardware accelerator.
Repeatability None N/A
Precisely de-
fined testing
configura-
tion
None N/A
Software
verification
Completeness [93, 95] CA4 ¶ Limited to specific NN
models; · Lack of scala-
bility.
Correctness [79] CA2 Automatic generation of
complete testing scenarios
sets.
[89, 91, 92, 96, 97]
[98] - [100]
CA4 ¶ Scalability and com-
putational performance
need to improve; · SMT
encoding for large-scale
NN mode; ¸ Lack of
model-agnostic veri-
fication methods; ¹
Automatic generation of
feature space abstractions
[100].
Repeatability None N/A
Precisely de-
fined testing
configura-
tion
None N/A
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In Table 4, we mapped existing T&V methods for NN-based SCCSs (col-
umn 3 and column 4) into relevant properties (column 2) of four major T&V
phases (column 1) in the software safety lifecycles of IEC 61508-3). For
column 5 in Table 4, we summarized the remaining challenges in testing
and verifying NN-based SCCSs based on reviewed papers. The overviews of
these remaining challenges provide motivations for researchers to look for a
potential focus in the future.
4.3.2. Limitations and suggestions for testing and verifying of NN-based SCCSs
In Table 4, we show the limitations and gaps of state-of-the-art T&V ap-
proaches for NN-based SCCSs. In this section, we will take two T&V phases
(evaluation of software architecture design and software module testing and
integration) as examples to provide detailed analysis of identified limitations
and corresponding suggestions on the basis of required safety integrity prop-
erties. For the other two T&V phases (programmable electronics integration
and software verification), only summaries of limitations and suggestions will
be presented to avoid duplication.
Evaluation of software architecture design. There are two properties, i.e.,
completeness with respect to software safety requirements specification and
Defense against common cause failure from external events, which have not
been addressed in reviewed papers. Correctness with respect to software
safety requirements specification (1 paper) and verifiable and testable de-
sign have drawn little attention (2 papers) for review studies. The top three
properties that have been addressed are: simplicity and understandability (31
papers), freedom from intrinsic design faults (10 papers), and fault tolerance
(5 papers).
Completeness with respect to software safety requirements spec-
ification No study contributes to the achievement of completeness, which
requires the architecture design to be able to address all the safety needs and
constraints. The achievement of completeness depends on the achievement of
other properties, such as fully understanding of the behavior of NN models.
The design and deployment of NN-based SCCSs is in its infancy stage. When
NN-based SCCS design becomes more practical, more studies may address
this topic.
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Correctness with respect to software safety requirements spec-
ification To achieve correctness, software architecture design needs to re-
spond to the specified software safety requirements appropriately. Study [94]
reported their successful design of a DNN-based compression algorithm for
aircraft collision avoidance systems. Even though they demonstrated that the
DNN-based algorithm preserve the required safety performance, the training
process is time-consuming.
Freedom from intrinsic design faults Intrinsic design faults can be
interpreted as failures derive from the design itself. State-of-the-art NNs
have proved to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations due to some in-
triguing properties of NNs [55]. Most of studies in this category were aimed at
understanding, detecting, and mitigating adversarial examples. Study [97]
reported that their approach could generalize well on several state-of-the-
art NNs to find adversarial examples successfully. However, the verification
process of founded features is time-consuming, especially for larger images.
In this sense, the scalability and computational performance of adversarial
robustness are expected to be addressed in the future. In addition, adversar-
ial robustness does not imply that the NN model is truly free from intrinsic
design faults. How to assure freedom from interferences (e.g., signal-noise ra-
tio degradation) other than adversarial perturbations is a research gap that
needs to be filled.
Understandability This property can be interpreted as the predictabil-
ity of system behaviour, even in erroneous and failure situations. In this cat-
egory, studies focusing on providing explanations for individual prediction
(e.g., [102]) and on visualizing internal layers of NN (e.g., [127, 128, 129])
are not meaningful for safety assurance. Studies focusing on facilitating un-
derstanding of the internal logic of NNs (such as presenting NNs as decision
trees [121]) could be a solution to improve the understandability of NN-based
architecture design. However, this line of work is rare, and most methods
are only applied to small-scale DNN with image input, or specific NN mod-
els. Besides, assuming the explanation of NN is available, confirming the
correctness of the explanation is still a challenge.
Interpretability of NNs is undoubtedly a crucial need in safety-critical
applications. Methods in this line should capable of explaining different type
of sensor data (e.g., image, text, and point data) and explaining both local
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and global decisions.
Verifiable and testable design The evaluation metrics of verifiable
and testable design may be derived from modularity, simplicity, provability,
etc. We observed that existing verifiable and testable designs are limited to
specific NN architectures (e.g., [90]) or specific tasks (e.g., [82]). There is
no standard procedure for determining which type of NNs will be easier to
verify. Ehlers [90] argued that NNs that adopt piece-wise linear activation
functions are easier to verify, but their method still need to face the conflict
between efficient verification and accuracy of linear approximation for the
NN behavior.
Fault tolerance Fault tolerance implies that the architecture design
can assure the safe behaviour of the software whenever internal or exter-
nal errors occurs. To achieve fault tolerance, features like failure detection
and failure impact mitigation of both internal and external errors should
be included in the design. Existing methods showed that unexpected envi-
ronmental failures are hard to detect and mitigate. Besides, many of the
proposed approaches in this category have not yet been proven sufficiently in
the real world. Some studies formulated approximated computational models
to represent real-world systems (e.g., [72]). The study [81] did not have any
test oracle when executing system flight tests. Some studies used simulation
models to verify the performance of the original NN (e.g., [73]). They are not
able to prove the fidelity of the model compared with the real-world system.
Defense against common cause failure from external events Soft-
ware common cause failure is a type of concurrent failure of two or more mod-
ules in the software, which is caused by software design defects and triggered
by external events such as time, unexpected input data, or hardware abnor-
malities [144]. Many safety critical systems adopt redundant architectures
(meaning two or more independent subsystems have identical functions to
back-up each other) to prevent a single point of failure. However, redundant
architectures are vulnerable considering common cause failure. In the con-
text of NN-based SCCSs, it is common to employ multiple NNs with similar
architectures in order to improve the accuracy of prediction. If a common
cause failure occurs in this kind of software design, the prediction might be
totally wrong, and thus the control software might make the wrong decision.
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DeepXplore reported in [83] used more than two different DNNs with the
same functionality to automatically generate a test case. If all the DNNs in
DeepXplore are affected by common cause failure, such as if a sensor failure
causes all the DNNs to make the same mis-classification, then it will not be
able to generate the corresponding test case. No method is found in reviewed
papers that can identify common cause failure modes and defend against such
failures.
In order to effectively defend against common cause failure, designers
need to inspect the completeness and correctness of the safety requirement
specification, trace the implementation of the safety requirement specifica-
tion, and make a thorough T&V plan to reveal the common cause failure
modes in the early stage.
Software module testing and integration. There is one property, precisely de-
fined testing configuration, which has not been addressed in reviewed papers.
This property aims to evaluate the precision of T&V procedure, which is not
in the scope of our selected papers. Therefore, we will not give more expla-
nation on this property. Repeatability has drawn little attention (3 papers)
from the reviewed studies. The top two properties that have been addressed
are: completeness of testing and integration with respect to the design speci-
fications (9 papers) and correctness of testing and integration with respect to
the design specifications (8 papers).
Completeness of testing and integration with respect to the de-
sign specifications We observed some efforts that tried to find a system-
atic way to generate testing cases (e.g., [84, 87]) to measure testing quality
(e.g., [86]) or to connect different T&V stages in the development of SCCSs
(e.g., [145]). As analyzed in Section 4.2, we can infer that an NN-based con-
trol software is instinctually different in design workflow and software devel-
opment compared to the design of traditional control software. We suggest
that the testing criteria should thoroughly align with the software design.
To be more specific, the instinctive features of NN-based software (e.g., NN
model’s architectural details and the working mechanism of NN) should be
carefully considered when setting the testing criteria. That is testing criteria
should be defined comprehensively and explicitly under the consideration of
not only test case coverage but also the robustness of NN-based system per-
formance (for instance, test how NN will respond when input data change
slightly) and the features of training data set, such as the data density issue
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mentioned in [146].
Correctness of testing and integration with respect to the de-
sign specifications Several studies (e.g., [54, 61, 62]) reported that their
methods are vulnerable to the variation of adversarial examples. Another
common limitation is that most methods are model-specific, meaning that
they can only apply to a single type or class of NN model. To achieve correct-
ness of testing and integration, the module testing task should be completed,
which means the testing should cover both NN models and external input.
Few studies focused on the validation of input data. One study [76] identified
that sufficient validation of input raw data remains a challenge.
Repeatability The complexity and un-interpretable feature of NNs
make manual testing almost infeasible. In order to be able to generate consis-
tent results from testing repeatedly, some studies were dedicated to achieving
automatic test execution or even automatic test generation. We found three
papers (i.e., [82, 83, 84]) addressing automatic test generation. However,
generating test cases automatically is still a challenge. For instance, studies
[83, 84] claimed that the test cases generated by automated testing tool may
not cover all real-world cases.
Programmable electronics integration. The major limitation of this line of
work is insufficient testing for hardware accelerator. NN-based SCCPSs re-
quires typically high-performance computing systems, such as Graphics Pro-
cessing Units (GPUs). Some industry participants have provided specialized
hardware accelerators to accelerate the NN-based computation. For exam-
ple, Google deployed a DNN accelerator (called Tensor Processing Unit) in
its data centers for DNN applications [147]. NVIDIA introduced an auto-
motive supercomputing platform named DRIVE PX 2 [33], which now has
been used by over 370 companies and research institutions in the automotive
industry [148]. However, little research effort has been put into the testing
and verification of the reliability of using hardware accelerator for NN ap-
plications. We found seven studies (i.e. [71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78]) addressing
the evaluation of the error resilience of hardware accelerator. However, the
testing is limited to specific type errors (e.g., radiation-induced soft errors,
which are presented in [71, 75, 78]). The mitigation method proposed in [75]
(called ABFT: Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance) can only protect portions
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of the accelerator (e.g., sgemm kernels, which is one kind of matrix multipli-
cation kernels). The study [76] identified errors made by single frame object
detectors, but the result showed that the method is not capable of detecting
all mistakes. The studies [71, 78] investigated the propagation characteristic
of soft errors in the DNN system, but they used a DNN simulator instead of
real DNN accelerator for fault injection.
Software verification. In general, there is a lack of a comprehensive, stan-
dardized framework for verifying the safety of NN-based SCCSs. Formal ver-
ification procedures is highly demanding. The common limitation of these
type of approaches is the scalability issues. Most of proposed methods are
limited to the specific NN structure and size (e.g., [90, 91, 96, 98, 99]). The
study of [91] reported that their approaches can only verify small-scale sys-
tems (i.e., the layer of NN is 3 and maximum amount of input neurons is
64). One approach reported in study [98] can verify medium size NNs. The
verification of large-scale NNs is still a challenge. Another limitation is that
proposed approaches are not robust to NN variations, for example, verifica-
tion methods in studies [90, 96] are only adapted to specific network types
and sizes.
5. Discussion
5.1. Industry practice
Our findings on the research questions (RQ1 to RQ3) mainly reflected the
academic efforts addressing testing and verification for NN-based SCCPSs.
NN-based applications have drawn a lot of attention from industry practi-
tioners. Taking the automotive industry as an example, several traditional
car makers (e.g., GM, BMW, and Toyota) and some high technology com-
panies (e.g., Waymo and Baidu) are leading the revolution in autonomous
driving safety. In this section, we first discuss industry practices on the safety
of the intended functionality [46]; then, we compare this SLR with related
works. At the end of this section, we present the threats to the validity of
our study.
5.1.1. Safety of the intended functionality
At the beginning of this year, ISO/PAS 21448:2019 was published; it
listed recommended methods for deriving verification and validation activi-
ties were recommended (See ISO/PAS 21448:2019 Table 4). In Table 5, we
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highlighted six of the recommended methods, which shared similar verifica-
tion interests with existing academic efforts.
Table 5: Shared verification interests of ISO/PAS 21448 and academic efforts
ISO/PAS 21448 Academic efforts
Analysis of triggering events CA1: Assuring robustness of NN
Analysis of sensors design and their known potential limitations CA2: Improving failure resilience of NN
Analysis of environmental conditions and operational use cases CA3: Measuring and ensuring test completeness
Analysis of boundary values CA4: Assuring safety property of NN-based SCCPSs
Analysis of algorithms and their decision paths CA5: Improving interpretability of NN
Analysis of system architecture CA1-CA5
In 2018, three automotive companies (Waymo, General Motor, and Baidu
Apollo) published their annual safety reports. As a pioneer in the develop-
ment of self-driving cars, Waymo proposed the “Safety by Design” [149]
approach, which entails the processes and techniques they used to face safety
challenges of a level 4 autonomous car on the road. For the cybersecurity
consideration, Waymo adopted Google’s security framework [150] as the foun-
dation. After that, General Motor (GM) released their safety report [151]
for Cruise AV (also level 4). GM’s safety process combined conventional
system validation (such as vehicle performance tests, fault injection testing,
intrusive testing, simulation-based software validation) with SOTIF valida-
tion through iterative design. Baidu adopted Responsibility-Sensitive Safety
model [152] proposed by Mobileye [153] (an Intel company) to design the
safety process for Apollo Pilot for a passenger car (level 3).
Referring to these three safety reports of existing autonomous cars, we
should be aware that when testing DNN-based control software (the core
part of autonomous vehicles), black-box system level testing (by observing
inputs and its corresponding outputs, e.g., closed course testing and real-
world driving) is still the leading method. More systematic testing and ver-
ification criteria and approaches are needed for more complete and reliable
testing results.
5.2. Comparison with related work
5.2.1. Verification and validation of NNs
Taylor et al. [15] conduct a survey on the Verification and Validation
(V&V) of NNs used in safety-critical domains in 2003. Study [15] is the clos-
est work we found, although they did not adopt a SLR approach. Our study
covered new studies from 2008-2018. The authors of [15] also made a classifi-
cation of methods for the V&V of NNs. They grouped the methods into five
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traditional V&V technique categories: automated testing and testing data
generation methods, run-time monitoring, formal methods, cross validation
and visualization. In contrast to [15], our study adopted a thematic analysis
approach [53] and identified five themes based on the research goals of the
selected studies. We thought it was better to classify the proposed T&V
methods of NNs based on their aims rather than on the traditional technique
categories since many traditional V&V technique are no longer effective for
verifying NNs in many cases. New methods and tools should be explored
and developed without being limited by the traditional V&V categories. An-
other difference is our study specialized more in the T&V of modern NNs,
such as MLP and DNN, whereas the study [15] provided more in-depth anal-
ysis of V&V methodologies for NNs used in flight control system, such as
Pre-Trained Neural Network (PTNN) and Online Learning Neural Network
(OLNN). Our study and [15] have some common findings. One category,
named Visualization in [15], falls into our category CA5: Improving inter-
pretability of NNs. This category plays an important role for researchers and
industry T&V practitioners to understand the performance of NNs.
5.2.2. Surveys of security, safety, and productivity for DL systems develop-
ment
Hains et al. [16] surveyed existing work on “attacks against DL systems;
testing, training, and monitoring DL systems for safety; and the verification
of DL systems”. Our study and [16] shared a similar motivation. The critical
difference between our SLR and [16] are in three folds: 1) We conducted our
literature review on 83 selected papers based on specific SLR guidelines, while
they used an ad hoc literature review (ALR) approach and reviewed only 21
primary papers. 2) They only focus on DL systems, whereas our scope cov-
ered modern NN-based software systems, which embodies DL-based software
systems. 3) They inferred that formal methods and automation verification
are the two promising research directions based on the reviewed works. In
contrast, we focused more on safety issue, and found more categories to be
addressed for safety purpose.
5.2.3. Surveys of certification of AI technologies in automotive
Falcini et al. [17, 18] reviewed the existing standards in the automotive
industry, pointed out the related applicability issues of automotive software
development standards to deep learning. Although our SLR takes the auto-
motive industry as an example, we are concerned with SCCPSs in general.
37
This concern is reflected in the distribution of the selected papers (only 13
of the 83 selected papers are oriented to automotive CPSs).
5.2.4. SLR of Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)
There are two very recent SLRs, [154] and [155], on the interpretation
of artificial intelligence. Both [154] and [155] employed similar commonly
accepted guidelines to conduct their SLRs. The fundamental difference be-
tween our study and [155, 154] is the scope. [154] reviewed 381 papers on
existing XAI approaches from interdisciplinary perspectives. As reported in
[155], the scope of their SLR is visualization and visual analytics for deep
learning. The study [155] focused on studies that adopted visual analytics to
explaining neural network decisions. Our study has a more comprehensive
coverage of testing and verification approaches that were employed to not
only interpret NN behavior but also to assure the robustness of NNs, to im-
prove the failure resilience of NNs, to ensure test completeness, and to assure
the safety property of NN-based SCCPSs. In a summary, our SLR tried to
provide an overview of key aspects related to T&V activities for NN-based
SCCSs.
5.3. Threats to validity
In this section, we discuss some threats to the validity of our study.
5.3.1. Search strategy
The most possible threat in this step is missing or excluding relevant
papers. To mitigate this threat, we used six of the most relevant digital
libraries to retrieve papers. Additionally, we employed two strategies to mit-
igate potential limitations in the search terms: 1) adopted a PICCO criteria
to ensure the coverage of search terms; and 2) improved search terms itera-
tively. Further, we conducted an extensive snowballing process on references
of the selected papers to identify related papers. The search keywords were
cross-checked and agreed on by both authors.
5.3.2. Study selection
Researchers’ subjective judgment could be a threat to the study selection.
We strictly followed the pre-defined review protocol to mitigate this threat.
For example, we started recording the inclusion and exclusion reasons from
the 4th selection round. We validated the inclusion and exclusion criteria
with two authors on the basis of the pilot search. Furthermore, the second
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author performed a cross-check of all selected papers. Any paper that raised
doubts about its inclusion or exclusion decision was discussed between the
first and second authors. For example, the “smart grid” is included in the
search term, but no relevant papers were found after the 4th selection round.
Then, we conducted a snowballing search to identify papers that presented
how to use NN in smart grid. We found out that AI is mainly used to
solve the economically-relevant problems [156] of the smart grid system (e.g.,
prediction of energy usage and efficient use of resources). AI is not involved
in the safety-critical applications (e.g., decision making on optimal provision
of power) of smart grid; therefore, there were no relevant papers addressing
safety analysis or testing/verification (refer to inclusion criteria 3).
5.3.3. Data extraction
In this stage, the first author was responsible for designing the data ex-
traction form and conducting the data extraction from selected papers. In
order to avoid the first author’s bias in data extraction, the two authors
continuously discussed the data extraction issues. The extracted data were
verified by the second author.
5.3.4. Data synthesis
Data analysis outcomes could vary with different researchers. To reduce
the subjective impact on data synthesis, besides strictly following the the-
matic synthesis steps [53], we disseminated our findings to other internal
research group at our university (e.g., the autonomous vehicle lab and au-
tonomous ships lab) for comments and feedback. The data synthesis was
also agreed on by both authors.
6. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have presented the results of a Systematic Literature
Review (SLR) of existing approaches and practices on testing and verification
methods for neural-network-based safety critical control software (NN-based
SCCS). The motivation of this study was to provide knowledge about the
state-of-the-art testing and verification of safety-critical NN-based SCCSs
and to shed some light on potential research directions. Based on pre-defined
inclusion and exclusion criteria, we selected 83 papers that were published
between 2001 and 2018. A systematic analysis and synthesis of the data
extracted from the papers and comprehensive reviews of industry practices
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(e.g., technical reports, standards, and white papers) related to our RQs were
performed. Results of the study show that:
1. The research on testing and verification for NN-based SCCSs is gaining
interest and attention from both software engineering and safety engi-
neering researchers/practitioners according to the impressive upward
trend in the number of papers on testing and verification of NN-based
SCCS (See Fig. 5). Most of the reviewed papers (68/83, 81.9%) have
been published in the last three years.
2. The approaches and tools reported for the testing and verification of
NN-based control software have been applied to a wide range of safety-
critical domains, among which automotive CPSs has received the most
attention.
3. The approaches can be classified into the following themes: assuring
robustness of NNs, improving failure resilience of NNs, measuring and
ensuring test completeness, assuring safety properties of NN-based SC-
CPSs, and imporving interpretability of NNs.
4. The activities listed in the software safety lifecycles of IEC 61508-3 are
still valid when conducting safety verification for NN-based control soft-
ware. However, most of the activities need new techniques/measures
to deal with the new characteristics of NNs.
5. Nine safety integrity properties within the four major safety lifecycle
phases, correctness, completeness, freedom from intrinsic faults, and
fault tolerance, have drawn the most attention from the research com-
munity. Little effort has been put on achieving repeatability. No re-
viewed study focused on precisely defined testing configuration and
defense against common cause failure, which are extremely crucial for
assuring the safety of a production-ready NN-based SCCS [157].
6. It is common to combine standard testing techniques with formal ver-
ification when testing and verifying large-scale, complex safety-critical
software [15, 143]. As explained in section 4.3, we found that an in-
creasing concern of the reviewed works is the integration of different
T&V techniques into a systematic manner to gain assurance for the
whole lifecycle of the NN-based control software.
This SLR is just a starting point in our studies to test and verify NN-
based SCCPSs. In the future, we would like to address some of the limitations
identified from this study.
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